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Background
Efficient and reliable animal health services constitute an
essential prerequisite to livestock development in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) . First, losses due to livestock
mortality in SSA are approaching US$2 billion per year, and
losses due to decreased growth, fertility and work output as
a result of disease are thought to be about as high (Annex
1) . Second, diseases deter many SSA smallholder farmers from
upgrading their stock to higher productive genotypes or even
from keeping livestock altogether. Third, the prevalence of
disease vectors such as the tsetse fly and ticks precludes
the adequate use of approximately 10 million square
kilometers of land in SSA by livestock. Fourth, the
prevalence of certain diseases causes the lucrative EEC
export markets -- which offer preferential prices for
developing countries — to remain closed to many countries of
SSA.
However, over the last decades, the quality of the animal
health services has deteriorated. The rapid expansion of
public sector veterinary staff — the dominant supplier of
veterinary services — at the expense of funding for means of
support and operating costs, forced drastic cutbacks in field
operations, and staff became office-bound and their morale
plummeted. Several studies (Anteneh, 1983, 1985; Leonard,
1984; de Haan and Nissen, 1985) documented this decline. At
the same time, the traditional leaders, who earlier imposed
on their herders' groups the discipline of sanitary control
and vaccination, lost authority under new post- independence
administrative arrangements and a power vacuum developed at
field level.
On the other hand, the demand for veterinary services has
increased sharply. First, traditional herders have become
more aware of the benefits of veterinary care, especially
since the Rinderpest outbreaks of the early 1980s, and are
willing to pay for effective and reliable veterinary
services. Second, livestock ownership has become more
diversified, as crop farmers, government officials, and
traders see livestock as one of the more profitable
investment opportunities. These new livestock owners
recognize the importance of disease control in reducing the
risk to their investment in livestock. However, they have no
experience in livestock raising and therefore depend much
more on outside assistance for veterinary care than
traditional pastoralists do. Third, in the past decade close
to 20 million cattle have moved into the humid disease-
infested savannahs from the less disease-prone semi arid
rangelands, and thus the demand for veterinary services in
the higher rainfall areas of SSA has increased dramatically.
Fourth, livestock prices have kept ahead of the cost of the
main drugs used and therefore have made veterinary care more
affordable. This can stimulate further intensification of
production, with more valuable cross-bred livestock pushing
up the demand for veterinary services and justifying the
higher expenditures involved.
Faced with dwindling resources and a growing demand, public
authorities and donor agencies began looking for alternative
ways of organizing and financing animal health care. Thus,
during the early eighties an active dialogue developed
between the heads of SSA livestock services and
representatives of donor agencies (Bujumbura, 1984; Blantyre,
1984; Berlin, 1986). Subsequently, several projects with
alternative forms of animal health services were initiated,
amounting to approximately US$500 million in foreign
commitments over the period 1985-1989.
Donor support has been mainly provided by (i) the European
Development Fund (EDF) , largely through its funding of the
OAU/IBAR-sponsored Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC) ,
which linked support for Rinderpest vaccinations to the
implementation of policy reforms to make the vaccination
campaigns self-sustaining and to alleviate some of the more
serious distortions in the sector; (ii) Technical Cooperation
Service of the Federal Republic of Germany (GTZ), which
focused on the development of basic animal health care
systems at the grass-roots level; (iii) Aid and Cooperation
Fund of France (FAC) , also through the financing of basic
animal health care systems and through the provision of
technical assistance to a number of national projects,
financed by multilateral donor institutions; and (iv) the
World Bank, which over the last five years has devoted an
increased share (up to 40 percent) of livestock funding to
improving animal health, combining structural reforms in the
privatization of animal health services and retrenchment of
government services, with investment activities. Further
important support has been provided by the Overseas
Development Association of the United Kingdom (ODA) , the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and
the African Development Bank (ADB) .
This paper outlines the types of reforms introduced in animal
health services over the past decade, summarizes past
experiences, provides a preliminary assessment of their
impact, and indicates what lessons need to be taken into
account in future policy adjustments and project investments.
The discussion concentrates on World Bank-supported
initiatives, because of the easier accessibility of the data
to the authors.
Reforms in SSA Livestock Services: Basic Principles
7. Animal health care services can be classified as private or
public goods, depending on who receives the benefits
(Leonard, 1984). At one extreme are purely private goods,
which (i) only benefit the animal owner receiving the
service; (ii) can be enjoyed exclusively by that owner (the
exclusion principle); and (iii) when provided, exclude
somebody else from that service at that particular time (the
rival principle). For example, clinical treatment for a
wound or worms would qualify as a pure private good because
(i) the treatment benefits only the owner of that animal;
(ii) nobody else benefits; and (iii) the treatment excludes
other farmers from the services of the veterinarian at that
time. In contrast, services like quarantine and meat
inspection are pure public goods as they do not directly
benefit the owner of the animal and do not exclude other
producers from that service.
8. As a general rule, the higher the private benefit, the more
justified it is to have the beneficiary pay for the service
directly and to transfer the service to the private sector.
Public sector management of private good services is
justified if economies of scale are an important
consideration or if sophisticated expertise or equipment is
needed. In such cases, the services should be financed
through direct payment from the beneficiaries and not from
general revenue. Pure public good services should be managed
by the public sector (although subcontracting to private
operators is always possible) and financed by the general
public revenue. Activities such as meat inspection
approximate a purely public service and should therefore be
financed and managed by public resources. The principal
animal health tasks in SSA and their degree of public/private
interest are listed in Table 1.
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9. The reforms most widely adopted in animal health care in SSA
since the early 1980s fall into the following categories:
(i) increase in the degree of cost recovery for veterinary
drugs, vaccinations, other inputs, and veterinary
interventions;
(ii) reorganization of public services to correct the
imbalance between staff and operating means and to
strengthen these services in animal health control,
policy planning, and livestock research and extension;
(iii) liberalization of veterinary drug import and distri
bution; and
(iv) transfer of responsibility for animal health care to
private veterinarians, middle-level technicians,
specially trained herder representatives (auxiliaries) ,
and even directly to the herders.
10. The basic objective behind all four reforms was — and still
is — to create, through cost recovery and liberalization,
the appropriate environment for the private sector to take
over some of the veterinary tasks formerly carried out as
public services. Once the government has delegated the
"privatizable" veterinary tasks to the private sector, it can
concentrate and improve on those tasks that need to remain in
the public domain. To ensure that public agencies can carry
out these tasks effectively, the reform package includes
institutional adjustments that provide for adequate and
continuous funding for their operations.
An Overview of the Initial Experiences
11. Probably the most important results of the policy dialogue
over the last five to six years is the growing realization of
African decision makers of the need for adjustment and their
better appreciation of opportunities for private animal
health care. While the early proposals on this subject
(Bujumbura, 1984) were met with considerable skepticism and
stressed government control of any privatization effort, more
recent meetings (Feldafing, 1990) with decision makers
recommend much more clearly that the government withdraw from
"privatizable" veterinary tasks. This change in attitude
augurs well for the future.
12. However, not all policy adjustments have met with the same
enthusiasm, nor has the reaction been the same at all staff
levels. For example, the policy of cost recovery for drugs
and noncompulsory vaccinations was widely accepted, but not
cost recovery for compulsory vaccination. As for the
response to privatization at different staff levels, a
subjective assessment seems to indicate that acceptance has
been greatest among senior policy makers and at the
producers' level. Many middle-level technicians have also
demonstrated a keen interest in the possibilities of
privatization. The response was more uneven among
professional and lower-level support staff who seem to
perceive the package of policy adjustments as a threat to
their individual interests. The remainder of the report
provides information on individual policy reforms.
Cost Recovery for Services Rendered
13. The introduction of a system of full cost recovery for
publicly provided services is essential to protect emerging
private initiatives from unfair competition. Furthermore,
cost recovery is crucial to enable governments to reduce
their financial burden, make the service sustainable and
independent of outside (international) financing, and ensure
that the service is efficiently used by the beneficiary.
Cost recovery becomes more justified as the private benefit
of the services increases.
14. Cost recovery for public sector supplied veterinary services
is probably the reform most widely introduced in SSA over the
past decade. This comes from a growing awareness that the
producer is quite willing to pay for good services and that
additional revenue must be found for these services from the
beneficiaries themselves since national budgets throughout
SSA are under the pressure of financial austerity. Cost
recovery introduced under Bank-funded projects did not cause
the demand for veterinary services to decline. Producers
were quite willing to pay a beneficiary contribution.
15. On the contrary, the total availability of the services seems
to improve and poorer people seem to gain greater access to
the services when cost recovery was introduced. Leonard
(1984) already showed that when staff began charging for
their curative visits, the work output increased
significantly, inequality in distribution was reduced by at
least one-half, and the more fully commercialized veterinary
staff graduated their charges according to the recipient's
ability to pay. Similar results were also found in the
Bank/IFAD/ADF funded livestock project in the Central African
Republic (CAR) , where the introduction of full pricing led to
improved drug availability, especially among the poor, who
purchased, on average, 50% more drugs per animal than the
wealthier livestock producers.
16. A partial contribution is nowadays charged to beneficiaries
in most SSA countries for voluntary vaccinations against less
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contagious diseases of little threat to the national herd
(theiluric diseases, anthrax, blackleg and pasteurellosis,
FMD in non-meat-exporting countries, and all poultry
vaccinations). This contribution is about US$0. 05-US$0 . 25
per vaccination, which covers the vaccine and some of the
other variable costs, but not staff salaries and other
overheads. The recovery of these costs would double the
charge. In order to gradually arrive at full cost recovery,
several Bank-funded projects have included specific cost-
monitoring exercises and an annual adjustment of the fee in
the program. It is critical to arrive as soon as possible at
full cost recovery for those non-compulsory vaccinations.
Most compulsory vaccinations (Rinderpest, CBPP and FMD in the
meat-exporting countries of SSA) were traditionally financed
fully out of general taxes and provided free to the producer.
However, the private benefits of these vaccinations seem
significant enough to ask for a direct contribution from
producers and now a number of countries have introduced
partial cost recovery. Although incomplete, initial data on
10 countries seem to corroborate the effectiveness of this
approach, as no depressing effect could be found from cost
recovery: Rinderpest vaccination coverage in the five
countries that had introduced a vaccination fee was 58%,
against 60% in those countries that had maintained a free
vaccination policy. These findings are not too surprising as
sociological research in several countries has shown that
producers are quite willing to pay for good services and that
even where the vaccinations are officially free the producer
is (illicitly) made to pay. Although the Bank recommends
some degree of cost recovery for compulsory vaccinations, it
generally acknowledges that other reforms (cost recovery for
voluntary vaccinations and all clinical interventions and
withdrawal of "privatizable tasks") are of higher priority
and should be pursued first.
18. Cattle dips to treat ticks and tick-borne diseases
(especially East Coast fever in East Africa), produce
predominantly private benefits. If participation is low,
however, the population of ticks resistant to the acaricide
may increase and pose a threat to all farmers, including
those participating in the program. There is thus a public
element in a dipping program. While dipping is economic and
essential in intensive production systems using exotic
crosses, its economic justification in extensive production
systems is doubtful. A study in the CAR livestock project in
1986 indicated that an average investment of US$15 per head
(which equals the annual revenue per animal) and a recurrent
annual charge of US$2 per head would be necessary to recover
all costs, including depreciation. This was more than the
herders were willing to pay, and the program was
discontinued. In the Ituri Project in Zaire, newly
established dips had an ex-post economic rate of return (ERR)
of 0 to 15% because of the high investment costs, and the
treatment produced little change in productivity. Studies
undertaken during the preparation of the Kenya Animal Health
Project in 1986 indicate that an increase of Ksh 0.30 to Ksh
1.50 per animal per dipping would be necessary to make the
dips self-financing, and the mortality figures would have to
drop from 10 to 8 percent per year to justify this fee
increase. This reduction is probably feasible in the heavily
infested East Coast Fever areas, but not elsewhere.
19. Cost recovery for dipping services has been disappointing in
terms of regularity and numbers dipped, but these results may
be due in part to an increase in hand spraying. In Kenya, a
dipping fee created a disincentive for regular and widespread
dipping, which was not overcome by making the dipping
compulsory (Sandford, 1983) . Meanwhile, Zimbabwe authorities
argue that their strictly enforced compulsory dipping program
is a success because it is free. However, in specific Kenyan
10
projects, with good services, farmers have shown clearly to
be willing to pay for dipping services—especially for
crossbred animals. A fixed fee per head to cover all
dippings over a longer period seems to produce better
revenues and herder participation than a system of payment
per dipping. This was the case in the Central Province in
Kenya, where revenues doubled after a lump sum for four
months per animal was introduced; also, the leakage of funds
diminished once dip attendants were no longer required to
handle small amounts of money continuously. With several new
technologies emerging (direct application of acaricides with
long residual effects, vaccines) and because of
disappointments in profitability and management of dips, the
best strategy seems to be to use for the time being simpler
means (knapsack sprayers) , until these more modern control
techniques become available. This is the current strategy of
the World Bank, which has stopped financing the construction
of new dips, although several Bank-financed projects are
still involved in rehabilitating existing facilities with
emphasis on cost recovery and the privatization of the
management.
20. Although the public good element of artificial insemination
(AI) is quite small, cost recovery for this service has not
yet reached a reasonable level. This is partly because in
most of SSA AI has only recently been introduced. During the
first years, the cost per farmer of a daily AI run, with only
a handful of farmers participating, is excessive, and some
initial subsidy is unavoidable while demand builds up.
However, it has proved difficult to phase out the subsidy
after the initial phase. According to calculations in Kenya
— the only SSA country in which the World Bank finances AI -
- in 1986, the real cost per insemination varied from Ksh 20
to Ksh 250, depending on the livestock density of the region,
but the government charged only Ksh 4 per insemination.
Farmers have obviously been willing to pay more than Ksh 4 as
private veterinarians were recently charging Ksh 30 per
insemination. But in many regions the real cost price
through government services was still substantially higher
than the farmer was willing to pay. Consequently, a
profitable, self-standing AI service is not likely to
materialize in the medium term, except in areas of high
density and intensive production where transport costs are
shared with fixed clinical runs and on some private "elite"
farms that are breeding bulls to be sold for natural mating.
21. Transfer of the revenues generated by the cost recovery to a
special account or revolving fund, under the responsibility
of the livestock services, is frequently sought by the
departments and donors alike. Through the establishment of
such a Livestock Development Fund (LDF): (i) livestock
services would become independent from erratic central
budgeting processes and cumbersome systems of financial
control; (ii) staff are better motivated to collect and users
to pay the fee, because there is a direct return in the form
of more means to operate and better services rendered; and
(iii) livestock services would be assured of long term
financial sustainability . LDFs have been included in a
number of recently approved bank-funded projects. The
supplementation of the LDF with the revenue of special
earmarked taxes, although included in a number of earlier
projects, is generally opposed by finance ministries and
institutions which are macro-economic oriented such as the
International Monetary Fund. They argue that because there
is no longer a direct link between services rendered and
revenue generated, it is more efficient to transfer the
revenues of such taxes to the central treasury where they can
be allocated across all sectors.
22. A decentralization of the decision making on the use of funds
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generated by cost recovery, for example, to the provincial
level has been argued (World Bank, 1987) because it would:
(i) help improve the utilization of resources since local
staff generally have a better idea of the needs of their unit
than some remote planner at headquarters; (ii) encourage
wider community participation in development activities; and
(iii) help bring down administrative costs, inasmuch as any
shift to a higher level of revenue collection increases the
administrative load, and the savings could be used for other
productive purposes.
At the same time, the efficiency gains expected from
decentralization need to be balanced against the possibility
of leakage. Experience has shown that recovery tends to be
low (30-50%) and that revolving funds become rapidly depleted
under a decentralized system of administration (i.e., at the
level of the vaccination yard, dip, or veterinary post).
This is clearly shown in many externally financed projects by
the dismal performance of veterinary pharmacies operated by
livestock posts. Therefore it seems prudent to keep admini
strative functions at an intermediate (i.e., provincial)
level where adequate control can be maintained and ample
motivation provided for local participation. As more
emphasis is placed on cost recovery, project designers need
to give increasing attention to the administrative management
and control of cost recovery revenues.
LDFs now exist in six SSA countries. Most of the LDFs
operate at the national level, except in Cameroon, which has
created three provincial LDFs. Thus far, experience with
these LDFs has been positive: revenues are in the range of
US$100, 000-500, 000 per year, and some LDFs have become
important operating tools of livestock services in the
countries concerned. The accounts have by and large been
certified by external audits. However, LDFs have not yet had
13
an opportunity to operate after external financing (and
external protection) has ended. Where that happens, it is
likely that the political pressure to reintegrate the
revenues into the eternally cash-strapped Treasury will be
stronger, although the need for these funds will also be much
greater.
Public Sector Reforms in Animal Health Care Services
25. One of the main reasons for the declining performance of
veterinary services in SSA during the 1960s and 1970s was the
rapid increase in personnel costs at the expense of nonsalary
recurrent funding (Anteneh, 1983, 1985; de Haan and Nissen,
1985) . From 1960 to 1976, veterinary service personnel costs
in West Africa increased at an average rate of 7% per year,
whereas nonstaff recurrent expenditure increased by only 3%
per year. As a result, the salary : nonsalary ratio, one of
the predominant indicators of the efficiency of a livestock
service, dropped from 64:36 in 1960 to 75:25 in 1976 in West
Africa, and from an excellent 40:60 in 1974 to a poor 70:30
in 1981 in Kenya. In contrast, in Southern Africa the ratio
remained close to the 50:50 optimum over the same period.
26. In 1984, some countries in SSA began introducing
institutional reforms to address this problem. The primary
purpose of these reform programs has been to stabilize or
reduce staff in government services, to establish LDFs, and
to increase direct government contributions to complement
nonsalary operating funds. The effect of these programs has
been assessed by comparing staffing and budget data from 20
countries (of which 8 had started to implement institutional
reform programs during 1985-1989) with data on the same
countries in earlier studies.
27. The results of this study indicate that, while the growth of
14
the staff numbers in some countries have levelled off, they
have in aggregate continued to grow over the past decade.
The total number of livestock service staff in the 20
countries surveyed jumped from just over 13,000 staff in the
mid-1970s to more than 25,000 in the second half of the
1980s. As a result, the average number of Veterinary
Livestock Units (VLUs) per veterinarian has declined from
almost 100,000 in the mid-1970s to just over 50,000 today,
and the number of VLUs per middle- and lower-level veterinary
assistant has dropped from 10,000 in the mid-1970s to about
7,000 now (Table 2). Overall growth has been the same in the
different regions, although in West Africa growth has been
particularly strong in the professional category, whereas in
Eastern and Southern Africa staff growth has occurred mainly
in the support category.
Table 2. Government Professional and Support Staff Ratios (VLU
per staff) in the Different SSA Regions
000 VLUs per Person
Region Professional Staff
Mid-1970s Mid-1980s
Western Africa
Eastern & Southern
Africa
95
120
30
80
Support Staff
Mid-70s Mid-'80s
7
14
Source: de Haan and Bekure (1991) .
28. Some of the key conclusions regarding staffing are that:
(i) the average staff level exceeds recommended norms
(200,000 VLUs per professional staff and 12,000 per
support staff) for disease prevention in extensive
production systems.
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(ii) the overall professional/support staff ratio exceeds,
especially in West Africa, the generally accepted
standards of about 1:20 for extensive systems and 1:10
for intensive systems.
(iii) substantial differences persist between countries,
ranging from 300,000 VLU per professional staff in
Ethiopia and Somalia to 20,000 VLU in Cote d'lvoire,
Ghana, and Senegal; the number of VLUs per support
staff varies from a high of 13,000 to a low of 900.
(iv) the state of a country's economy (measured by the level
of per capita income) seems to be an important
determinant of the amount of staff resources allocated
to the sector; countries with a per capita GDP of more
than US$800 had denser coverage in professional and
support staff than the countries below the US$800 per
capita income level.
29. Some of the key trends regarding the budgets of 16 livestock
services for which data were available are:
(i) the recurrent financial budget of these services grew at
about the same rate as the staff numbers. The growth was
relatively strong in West Africa, but was less pronounced
in East and Southern Africa, although differences in
exchange rate adjustments over this period might have
affected these changes. Budget increases generally fell
below inflation rates.
(ii) differences between individual countries are significant,
however, budgets of the livestock services in the
wealthier countries (per capita GDP of more than US$800) ,
increased by an average of 16 percent, compared with only
1 percent in the poorer countries.
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(iii) as a result of these tendencies, the salary/nonsalary
budget ratio remained about the same, although again it
varied greatly from one country to another. In West
Africa, of the ten countries for which complete data were
available, three countries improved, but four remained in
the very poor 85:15 ratio range, where it becomes
practically impossible to provide effective service. In
Eastern and Southern Africa the average ratio worsened
somewhat but is still satisfactory. However, this
average is mainly based on the good budget allocations of
Zimbabwe and Kenya and does not include some of the
countries with less favorable budget allocations.
30. The erosion of the purchasing power of the individual
salaries of the staff and the decline in their nonsalary
operating funds in many countries continue to lead to poorly
motivated staff and inadequate resources to satisfy sharply
increased demands. Thus there is still a need for reforms
and for the government to disengage from some of its tasks.
Since countries vary greatly also in this regard, it is
important to prepare institutional and public expenditure
analyses and reorganization plans on an individual country
basis, as already recommended earlier (de Haan and Nissen,
1985) .
The Liberalization of Drug and Vaccine Import and Distribution
(i) Drug imports
31. Drug imports were, until recently, handled by parastatals in
most SSA countries. The majority of these drug companies
were poorly managed and developed serious financial problems
because of their high overhead and the below-cost pricing of
the drugs, frequently forced upon them by central ministries
under the mistaken impression that the producer would not pay
17
the full price. As a result of these restrictive policies,
only a part of the demand was satisfied through official
channels and an active parallel (black) market emerged
outside the control of the government.
32. Over the last decade, several SSA countries have liberalized
both imports and distribution. Chabeuf (1990) reports that
of the 29 countries he surveyed, 18 had liberal imports and
22 liberal local distribution. This liberalization seems to
have had a positive effect on drug use. Although confounded
by climate and price differences and illegal trade between
countries, this study's data show that between 1985 and 1988,
for example, the average consumption of drugs in countries
with a government monopoly was US$0.14 per VLU per year,
whereas the consumption in countries that had adopted a freer
trade policy was US$0.46 per VLU per year.
33. However, external donors continue to finance parastatal drug
import and distribution companies, in particular their
rehabilitation. The rationale put forward is that (i) the
private sector is not interested in servicing the remote
areas, (ii) parastatals are better able to handle the
donations in veterinary drugs, and (iii) parastatals are
needed to generate funds for the government livestock
services. In such externally funded projects, privatization
would be sought, once the parastatal is rehabilitated.
However, in almost all Bank projects reviewed, full
rehabilitation seems always "just around the corner" but
never still fully achieved, and none of the parastatals under
rehabilitation in Bank (and other donor) funding have yet
been privatized.
34. One might thus question the wisdom of continued support for
parastatal drug companies. Experience shows that the impact
of parastatal companies is very limited. In the few
18
countries with only private importers, distribution to the
remoter areas is as good or better than it is under any
parastatal company. Furthermore, the private sector tends to
lose interest in participating when a public company is
already involved, as implied by the lower consumption in
countries that have maintained a parastatal company besides
the private importers in comparison with those that relied
entirely on the private sector for their imports. Even in
the semi-arid pastoral rangelands where the density of
livestock and humans is low, it is difficult to justify
keeping the government in charge of drug distribution.
Distribution through local herders' associations under the
umbrella of a national federation, as done in the CAR (Annex
2) provides a far superior alternative, and perhaps this
ought to be considered as the future model in these
countries. Even in those cases where the public sector needs
to be involved in drug distribution, it should be in support
of the private sector by distributing drugs in remote areas,
and should not move into import or wholesale trade.
Furthermore, rather than maintaining costly parastatals, it
could be envisioned to subcontract drug distribution in
remote areas to private distributors, compensating them with
a special subsidy for the extra cost involved.
Although many African countries have been moving toward freer
foreign exchange markets, currency restrictions in several
countries are still preventing drugs from becoming widely
available. A common approach to this problem is to have
outside donors refinance the revolving funds, but this is
only a temporary solution and drug supply comes to a halt the
moment the foreign exchange source dries up. When foreign
exchange controls are lifted problems are not over yet, as
normally there is an initial period of high inflation, which
makes it difficult to refinance revolving funds. Where the
average turn around time for drugs is longer than six months,
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the purchasing power value of the local currency during this
period can drop dramatically allowing only a small part of
the original stock to be replenished. The problem is
especially acute in public sector agencies or projects where
price changes are generally slow and well behind the pace of
inflation. In such circumstances, countries need a very
dynamic price mechanism with a high margin to achieve a
continuous alignment between sale price of drugs and the
exchange rate.
(ii) Vaccine production
36. The growing public sector involvement in vaccine production
is of considerable concern. The number of vaccine production
laboratories in SSA has virtually doubled in the past 10
years and all major and most smaller livestock-producing
countries now have their own vaccine production laboratories.
This trend accelerated in the mid-1980s following the 1982
Rinderpest outbreak and the resulting scramble for scarce
Rinderpest vaccine. In the wake of this strong expansion,
however, there is a large excess capacity in the region.
Furthermore, the vaccines used for the most common diseases
(Rinderpest, common poultry diseases like New Castle disease)
are produced more economically in established large-scale
laboratories. Except for two private laboratories in SSA,
all laboratories are government-owned and usually under the
supervision of the livestock department. Because of the
existing excess capacity, practically all laboratories have
operating deficits, and what should be self-financing
operations depend on subsidies from the government,
frequently even above the direct payment of salaries from the
treasury. Production costs of about US$0.10 per dose are
calculated, with a sales price ranging from US$0.03 to
US$0.05 per dose.
37. This proliferation of national vaccine laboratories is not
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justified, especially now that emergency buffer stocks of
Rinderpest vaccine are being maintained in selected SSA
laboratories under the Pan African Rinderpest Campaign
(PARC) . The frequently heard argument that local operations
reduce foreign exchange needs is not very strong as the
process requires a high share of imported supplies. Regional
cooperation, and consolidation of the many small national
laboratories into larger, more specialized regional
laboratories needs therefore to be pursued and once
consolidated, privatization sought of those larger
laboratories. Any plan for the construction of new
laboratories, or the expansion of existing ones, seems only
justified if it would attract private interest. Most
existing national laboratories are too small to attract such
attention, and—like parastatal drug import and distribution
companies—none in SSA have yet been privatized. Reforms
have been limited to reducing the most obvious distortions,
for example, by organizing vaccine production in separate
self-contained and self-financing units that charge real
prices.
(iii) prug distribution
38. Until recently, only the staff of veterinary services were
allowed to distribute drugs, and this is still the case in
some countries. Such restrictions were fully justified in
the first half of the century, when drugs were not charged to
the producers, were expensive in relation to livestock
prices, contained ingredients toxic to humans, and improper
use produced serious side effects. In the past three
decades, however, mass production techniques have reduced
drug costs, and research has eliminated many unwanted side
effects. On the other hand, the deteriorating quality of
government services in the field, strongly restricted drug
distribution, and as a result, a flourishing black market
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developed in many SSA countries. With the aid of external
support, many countries have therefore introduced more
liberal distribution, although like in the other policy
thrusts, progress is partial. Several countries maintain an
unjustified discriminatory system, allowing government
technicians to distribute and apply prescription drugs, but
prohibiting private technicians to do so.
39. An important issue concerns the drug types that can be
purchased without prescription. Proponents of a liberal
policy argue that it is necessary to include the crucial
drugs on the non-prescription list, to interest non
professionals operating private veterinary care and to limit
the much more dangerous black market, now rampant throughout
SSA. Opponents of free distribution point to the danger of
drug resistance as a result of incorrect dosage by laymen and
the competition these laymen would pose to self-employed
professional veterinarians. Preliminary experience seems to
justify a liberal policy, as it seems to reduce black
marketeering and adulteration. In the CAR, where drugs have
become more available through the Federation Nationale d'
Eleveurs Centrafricaine (FNEC) (Annex 2) , the share of drugs
purchased by herders on the black market fell dramatically.
Furthermore, surveys showed that the majority of the herders
and lower-level technicians are capable of handling most
drugs very properly.
Privatization of Clinical Interventions
40. Privatization of veterinary services has been at the
forefront of all recent discussions on animal health
policies. There are a number of compelling reasons for such
a move. Economically, veterinary activities like clinical
interventions and voluntary vaccinations are exclusively
private in nature and have a clientele that is willing to pay
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for the services, as has amply been demonstrated.
Financially, public services cannot maintain a full scale of
services, and need to concentrate on those services, which
government has to fulfill, i.e. the services with a high
"public good" element. The large number of veterinarians and
livestock technicians graduating in SSA each year who cannot
be absorbed by the public sector creates social problems.
Privatization is a high-profile component of most recent
Bank-funded livestock operations. In most of these projects,
privatization is not restricted to the development of profes
sional veterinary practices, but more importantly, involves
the transfer of public sector tasks to other levels (middle-
level technicians, veterinary auxiliaries, and producers) .
The approaches used to date in these different categories
are outlined in the following paragraphs.
(i) Professional veterinarians
41. Self-employed veterinary professionals, common in other parts
of the world, are still rare in SSA. At present, they are
operating only in the main urban centers, in the commercial
livestock industries, and in some high potential areas.
Private veterinary care has been — and in many instances
still is — stifled by (a) unfair competition from public
services which dispense subsidized treatments and often use
paraveterinary staff to compete with would-be professional
private veterinarians; (b) a preference for — and sometimes
an obligation to employ -- new graduates in the civil
service; (c) the uncertain availability of drugs and
equipment; and (d) the perceived poor financial prospetcs for
private veterinarians, especially in the pastoral and
smallholder areas.
42. These disincentives are now being addressed in the context of
macro-economic adjustment programs and recently approved
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macro-economic adjustment programs and recently approved
livestock projects, and special incentives are being
established to improve profitability. Income projections for
private veterinarians in Bank staff appraisal reports vary
from US$4,000 to US$35,000 per year. Such projections seem
to be somewhat optimistic, and earnings from a private
practice are likely to be below the income earned by a
government veterinarian in many parts of Africa. This should
not, however, deter professional veterinarians from
considering self-employment, as it will be impossible to
fully absorb veterinary graduates (the numbers of graduate
veterinarians in SSA increases by 10-20% per year) in govern
ment posts (which, applying average public sector require
ments, would have already about 2,000 professional
veterinarians available for self employment) . Privatization
can provide the impetus needed to improve the quality of
veterinary services. The marginal profitability does mean,
however, that in the professional practices preference needs
to be given to areas with higher potential, such as those in
which dairy production is more intensive, those around urban
centers with a growing poultry industry, and those with some
commercial ranching. In addition, private professional
veterinarians could — in some countries, they already do —
play a central role in the import and wholesale distribution
of drugs. In the lower potential areas, veterinary care
needs to be delegated to middle- and lower-level technicians
or to producers themselves, ideally under the supervision of
private professional veterinarians. Although basic animal
health care has been successfully introduced at the middle
and lower levels, the basic animal health care system in SSA
has not yet been adequately linked up with private
professional veterinarians. This is a critical issue that
needs more attention in future project design.
43. Although some issues still need to be resolved, interest in
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privatization is rising in the changing policy climate in
SSA, and in the face of frozen recruitment and retrenchments
of public servants in many countries. In a number of surveys
carried out for the preparation of the project for Bank
funding, most veterinarians were positive about getting into
private practice. Another encouraging development is the
creation and rehabilitation of national associations of
veterinarians (NAV) . Such professional associations are
nongovernmental organizations that represent the interests of
the veterinary profession and can be highly effective
interlocutors in these discussions. NAVs, however, are not
yet sufficiently strong to give business management training
and administrative support to private veterinarians and would
require technical assistance until their membership fees can
support such activities.
44. Special incentives to encourage the establishment of private
veterinary practices included in externally funded projects
(a) financial support in the form of credit, sometimes
supplemented by grants in kind, for those leaving government
service;
(b) partial salary payment for a limited period in those
areas where livestock density is too low to provide an
adequate income;
(c) subcontracting of public sector services at remunerative
rates to self-employed veterinarians;
(d) transfer of facilities and transport equipment to the
private operator who would then pay only for their
maintenance and operation;
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government employees to test the feasibility of private
practice; and
(f) the free or subsidized provision of office and
laboratory facilities combined with part-time employment,
which combines (c) and (d) above. Introduction of one or a
combination of these incentives started in mid-1987, and it
is too early to tell whether the incentives are strong enough
to encourage the development of private veterinary practices.
45. Experience thus far suggests that the following two issues
merit specific attention when designing a privatization
program:
Balance between the public and private sector. This balance
is of concern in almost all externally funded projects as
they seek to stimulate privatization, and at the same time
to improve the performance of public sector tasks. The
latter is necessary in part because the tasks are important
in themselves and need to be strengthened, but also because
it is vital to interest the government in the overall
project. However, the investment in equipment, the financing
of allowances, and the funding of clinical services gives
government veterinarians strong advantages over any newly
established private ones and discourages government
veterinarians from leaving the public sector.
Full cost recovery by government services. There is an
innate resistance in the public sector to charge real costs
for the services it provides. Still, it is essential to do
so if the private practitioner is to be assured of an
adequate income. Arguments are frequently put forward that
cost recovery can only be gradually introduced, because of
the necessity to improve services first to a level where
producers would be willing to pay for them. However, where
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producers would be willing to pay for them. However, where
farmers are quite willing to pay for veterinary service,
valuable opportunities to develop sustainable services were
missed. Therefore, a comprehensive approach, which will
eliminate all unfair competition from the public service
seems to be a prerequisite for the success of professional
private veterinary practice.
(ii) Other groups
46. While progress in self employment of professional
veterinarians has been minimal, considerable progress has
been gained with lower-level skills, notably (a) private
middle-level technicians with one to four years of technical
training after primary training for the sedentary production
systems; and (b) producer representatives (auxiliaries) with
varying educational backgrounds specially trained for the
pastoral production systems. These non-professionals are
better equipped to serve the extensive production systems in
particular, because:
o their income aspirations are below the level a
professional expects and can be met in most production
systems ;
o communication between the non-professional animal health
worker and the producer -- frequently from the same ethnic
group — is generally better than between the professional
veterinarian and the producer, who are frequently from
different backgrounds; and
o a large proportion (80-90%) of the veterinary inter
ventions required in the extensive production systems are
simple and can be done by less qualified persons,
especially if they are properly supervised.
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47. Although private non-professional animal health care is a
fairly recent phenomenon in SSA, it is now being tested in at
least 10 countries involving 8 million head of livestock; it
is also expected to be introduced in much broader scope in
another 10 countries. Non-professional systems seem to be
providing a viable alternative to the poorly functioning
public services. Middle-level technicians have been
successfully employed in non-professional animal health care
in sedentary livestock production systems in West and Central
Africa (see Annex 2), while satisfactorily operating
veterinary auxiliaries are a feature of pastoral production
systems in the Sahel and East Africa.
48. Empirical data on the quality of the service provided by non
professional agents are scarce. Surveys in the Central
African Republic indicated that in pastoral systems about 90%
of the herders-auxiliaries there used drugs against internal
parasites correctly, 85% of the producers diagnosed trypano
somiasis correctly, and 75% of the herders calculated the
dosage within 10% of the recommended amounts. Vaccinations
against anthrax and blackleg were carried out properly as
well. These figures compare favorably with surveys on the
level of expertise of government field staff in some
countries, which frequently show lower scores for the proper
disease diagnosis and correct dosage administration.
Experience in other countries corroborate the auxiliaries'
expertise in diagnosing disease and judging dosage. However,
more research and monitoring will obviously be required to
adequately assess levels of expertise, especially with
auxiliaries recruited from populations relatively new to
livestock raising. Experience with veterinary services for
the work-oxen of crop farmers suggests that the farming
population involved is much less skilled in diagnosing and
treating animal disease and that it was difficult to recruit
auxiliaries sufficiently familiar with livestock raising.
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This difference in skills between pastoral and mixed farmers
suggests a two-pronged approach, following a rather liberal
drug distribution policy for pastoral producer, using their
representatives as the main channel, and a more restricted
policy with mixed farmers new to livestock raising, using
higher-qualified technicians as the main agents.
49. Lessons drawn from past experience in the organization of
non-professional animal health care are:
Organization. Non-professional animal health care is not
sustainable unless the auxiliary is integrated into a group
or association at the grass roots level and there is a
reliable supply system for equipment and drugs at the
national level. The integration in producers groups is
recommendable also in a broader context, as many groups now
go beyond animal health care and take responsibility in other
tasks such as water point maintenance and range management.
Animal health care then becomes the catalyst for group
formation in better management of communal resources. The
input supply side seems to be the weakest link. Input supply
for the auxiliaries is generally handled by the project or is
left to a parastatal company, thus seriously endangering
post-project sustainability. Fully self-financing and
independent input supply institutions need to be developed to
respond adequately to otherwise well-established non
professional animal health care.
Selection and training. It is important for the veterinary
auxiliary to come from the community he or she is to serve,
particularly in the pastoral production systems, and to
maintain close ties with his community during the training
period. Selection on the basis of literacy rather than
origin and representation, as frequently done, means that the
auxiliary does not have the basis to fall back on later and
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results in disappointing performance. Maintaining contact
with the home front is also important when deciding on the
course format. Short (3-6 days) , frequently repeated (every
6 months) programs, involving not only the auxiliary, but
also the traditional hierarchy is much more successful than
long, continuous training periods without any contact with
their group of origin.
Remuneration. Although it is important to integrate the
auxiliary into an association, experience shows that there is
a danger that the auxiliary will become a poorly remunerated
social worker. when that happens, the interest of the
auxiliaries dies quickly. Consequently, a combination of a
small retainer paid by the association and a margin on the
sale of drugs seems to be essential to maintain the
auxiliaries' interest.
Government involvement. Non-professional animal health care
should develop as a private activity, and the government's
role should be restricted to technical support/training and
ex-post control and should exclude day-to-day management.
Day-to-day supervision should be entrusted to private
veterinarians, although this is one of the key links still
missing in the system.
Funding and assistance. Establishing a non-professional
animal health care system is a location-specific, protracted,
and incremental task without a high funding requirement.
Most external donors (including the World Bank) and national
governments are not as well equipped to handle such a task as
NGOs, which therefore should be encouraged to assist in the
development of pastoral associations and basic animal health
care systems.
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(iii) Groups and special animal health tasks
50. Group responsibility for animal health tasks ranges from the
management of all health tasks and artificial insemination,
to the simpler tasks of managing dips and the veterinary
stores. Experience with group management of dips has been
mixed. The turnover in group-managed dips was in most
projects higher than in government-managed ones, although
access to the dip sometimes becomes an inequitable political
tool in the hands of the president of the group. Experience
in Kenya showed that communities performed rather poorly in
maintaining the required acaricide level of the dipping
fluid, resulting in a much higher incidence of tick borne
diseases in areas of community controlled dips than in areas
with government controlled dips (Leonard 1984) . The present
approach in Bank-funded projects is to transfer the dips to
the community but to improve government capability in
monitoring the dip operation.
51. Success in managing veterinary stores also depends on the
control and quality of management. The overall financial
management of these seems better in the more hierarchically
structured and more tightly controlled pastoral societies
than in crop farmers' groups. Group veterinary pharmacies
appear to be operating satisfactorily in a number of Bank-
funded projects, and the associations' revolving funds are
now also used for additional functions besides the veterinary
pharmacy. Post-project sustainability has been disappointing,
however, and considerable efforts are necessary to establish
improved internal control systems and to strengthen the role
of the auxiliary in directly managing the revolving fund.
52. In summary, while the initial experiences with private non
professional animal health care have been positive,
especially when integrated into producers' groups, some
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important steps still need to be taken. The countries of SSA
should now focus on establishing a reliable input supply
system, involve private veterinarians in the management of
private non-professional health care, clarify the
relationship between the official livestock service and the
non-professional animal health care system, and ensure
quality control and financial sustainability.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
53. The measures recently introduced in animal health care in SSA
are still too new to provide a full and objective assessment
of their impact. However, on the basis of progress to date,
the following policies can be recommended.
(i) Imports and distribution of veterinary pharmaceuticals
can be transferred to the private sector. The private sector
also needs to be involved in vaccine production, although
privatization here needs to be preceded by consolidation of
SSA's many small laboratories into larger regional units.
(ii) Full cost recovery for government services needs to be
introduced as an essential prerequisite for any private
involvement in veterinary services. Cost recovery has been
widely introduced in SSA over the past decade and has yielded
satisfactory results for clinical and prophylactic interven
tions, and with no immediately apparent negative impact on
equity. It has been less successful in the more marginal
activities like cattle dipping and artificial insemination.
(iii) Further measures are needed to redress the ratio
between salary and non-salary operating costs of government
services. While a number of countries have made progress in
improving the operational efficiency of their public
services, services in many countries still operate under
salary/nonsalary ratios which do not allow efficient
functioning.
(iv) In many African countries, the development of private
non-professional veterinary services as part of producers'
organizations would be the first step to privatization.
Their representatives (auxiliaries) , if properly trained,
have been shown to be capable of carrying out most treatments
correctly, and group formation around animal health has been
an important precursor to other cooperative activities.
(v) The use of self-employed veterinarians has up till now
not been successful and needs to be pursued more vigorously.
They need to form the critical link between the government
service and the private auxiliaries, and the present vacuum
created by the missing link may endanger the success of the
auxiliary-based system.
54. Thus, while the overall initial results are encouraging, any
definite claim of success would be premature, and at this
stage it is essential to continuously monitor the unfolding
impact of these reform measures so that the conclusions of
this report can be empirically tested. It seems that if this
course is continued — supplemented with other technologies
such as simple feed improvements, small stock development,
smallholder cattle fattening and dairy operations, which have
all shown some degree of promise in ongoing livestock
projects — livestock should be able to play a catalytic role
in SSA's agricultural development and alleviate the huge meat
and milk deficit projected for SSA in the 21st century.
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ANNEX 1
ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA INITIAL
EXPERIENCES WITH NEW APPROACHES
AN ESTIMATE OF LOSSES CAUSED BY DISEASES
1. The losses caused by animal health problems can be classified
into direct and indirect losses. Direct losses are mainly
caused by mortality while indirect losses are caused by
decreased growth, fertility and work output (morbidity
losses) . Estimates of direct losses are in the order of US$ 2
billion per year. The importance of indirect losses is more
difficult to estimate, but are generally thought to be of the
same order of magnitude. The breakdown of the estimated
direct losses per class of animals is as follows:
Category Total Population Av. Mortality Av. Price Total Loss
(million head) (%) (US$) (million US?)
Cattle
20 40 320
5 200 1200
Calves 40
Adults 120
SheeD & Goats
Lambs/kids 80
Adults 140
Pigs
All 10
Poultry
Village 400
Intensive 100
25 10 200
10 20 280
10 30 30
20 2 160
5 3 15
Total 2205
The total of US$ 2 billion concurs with figures provided by FAO.
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There is a lack of quantitative information on the relative
importance of the different diseases. Disease surveys carried
out in specific regions, frequently in the framework of a
project, show an overwhelming importance of internal
parasites especially as a cause of young stock mortality.
Furthermore they show, slightly less but still very
important, losses caused by diseases transmitted by external
parasites (ticks, e.g. East Coast Fever, Anaplasmosis, etc.
especially in East and Southern Africa) . The ANNEX 1 losses
resulting from the major contagious diseases Rinderpest and
Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia (CPBB) , are relatively
insignificant, because of the reasonable level of immunity
resulting from national annual vaccination campaigns,
resuscitated after the major outbreaks in 1982-1983. The
major cost concerning these diseases consist in maintaining
immunity at the level required to prevent a repetition of
such general outbreaks. The vaccination against Rinderpest is
therefore the main--and sometimes only--task of SSA's
livestock services. Under most of Africa's extensive
production systems. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) does not
result in major economic losses and therefore does not
warrant a generalized vaccination coverage. Blanket
vaccination might be justified in intensive dairy production
and for those countries (presently Botswana, Zimbabwe and
provisionally Madagascar) which have a preferential access
for meat and meat products to the European Economic
Community. Trypanosomiasis or animal sleeping sickness,
transmitted by the tsetse fly, precludes raising of trypano-
sensitive breeds (90% of SSA's cattle population and 70% of
SSA's small ruminant population) in tsetse infested areas,
unless maintained permanently on a drug regime. Peste de
Petit Ruminant (PPR) is a major killer of sheep and goats in
the humid zones of West and Central Africa. The use of
Tissue Culture Rinderpest (TCR) vaccine, which has been found
effective against PPR, is increasingly being used. New
Castle Disease, coccidiosis and fowl pox are the major killer
diseases of poultry. Vaccines are available for all
diseases. A number of countries (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Cote
d'lvoire, etc.) have started vaccinations of village poultry
with good effect.
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ANNEX 2
AHIMAL HEALTH SERVICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA INITIAL
EXPERIENCES WITH NEW APPROACHES
LIST OF IMPORTANT PROJECTS AIMED AT PRIVATIZATION OF VETERINARY CARE
Countrv Donor (s)
Burkina FAC
Central IDA/ 1 FAD/1
African Rep.
Camerooni IBRD/ IFAD
Main Focus
Village poultry/small ruminant
vaccinations
I /EEC/FAC Drug distribution and herders
training through national
herders federation.
Private import and distribution
systems, private practices for
professional and mid-level
technicians
Chad
Chad
GTZ Veterinary auxiliaries
EEC/ IDA/FAC/ADB Privatization with professional
veterinarians, mid-level
technicians and herders'
associations (auxiliaries)
Chad FAC Privatization with auxiliaries
in cotton region
Cote d'lvoire CCCE/GTZ/FAC Village pharmacies and private
auxiliaries
Ethiopia IDA
Guinea (Conakry) IDA/CCCE/FAC
Service cooperatives and
auxiliaries.
Private imports, and
privatization at various
levels.
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Kenya
Nigeria
Mali
I DA/ IFAD/OPEC
IBRD/EEC
IDA
Senegal (Eastern
Senegal) IDA
Somalia (Animal
Health) IDA/GTZ
Somalia (Central
Rangelands) IDA
Sudan (Western
Savannah) IDA
Uganda
Zaire (Ituri) IDA/FAC/CIDA
Private professional practices,
privatization of dips; cost
recovery.
Studies
Herder associations, auxiliaries
Herder and village associations
Veterinary auxiliaries
Cost recovery measures
Privatization with professinal
practitioners and auxiliaries
De facto privatization,
External support in advanced
stage of planning.
Regional herder associations
and auxiliaries.
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